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A RECIPROCAL WELFARE PROGRAM 
AmyL. Wax* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
What do people owe one another? The difficulties inherent in 
answering this question reveal that reciprocity is a problematic 
concept with an uneasy place in political theory and social prac-
tice. 1 Developing a normative theory of reciprocal social relations 
is one part of the larger project of describing a just society. Like 
that project, it is rife with problems of definition and justification. 
These puzzles find reflection in the practical uncertainties that 
arise in designing and maintaining the kinds of cooperative social 
systems in which reciprocal relationships hold a central place. 
The purpose of this essay is to explore in a preliminary way 
what it would mean to adopt reciprocity as the central, unifying 
principle of social welfare policy in a liberal democratic society. 
The theory and practice of reciprocity are potentially important to 
the design and political stability of centrally orchestrated, bureau-
cratic systems of redistribution that have been adopted in Western 
capitalist societies over the past 100 years or so. The welfare state 
serves to protect against misfortune, mitigate predictable disabil-
ity, and smooth out the effects of free markets. The redistribution 
of resources through governmentally mandated tax and benefits 
programs can be viewed as a dynamic process of collecting re-
sources from members of a group to create a common pool of as-
sets. Resources from that pool are dispensed to other members of 
the group for particular purposes under defined conditions. In 
modern societies, these resources need not be generated, collected, 
and reallocated through spontaneous, voluntary mechanisms of 
* Class of 1948 Professor of Scholarly Research in Law, University of Virginia School 
of Law. 
1 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971). See also Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, 
Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment 261-64 (1990) (stating that "[p]uzzles 
abound in the theory of self-interested reciprocity."); Andrew Levine, Rethinking Liberal 
Equality From a "Utopian" Point of View (1998). 
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private association. Rather, that process can be accomplished 
through the offices of a centralized authority that is established 
through democratic assent. 
II. THE PRINCIPLE OF CONDITIONAL RECIPROCITY 
There is evidence that a powerful set of psychological re-
sponses governs people's attitudes towards the sharing of re-
sources with others, including those less well off than themselves. 
Specifically, it appears that in this context people are not always 
motivated by straightforwardly selfish motives, as the conven-
tional rational actor model would predict. They do not always act 
exclusively from self-interest. In some settings, however, their 
willingness to behave unselfishly appears contingent on similar 
generosity from others, and they will punish those who seek to ex-
ploit or take advantage of them, even at some cost to themselves. 2 
Some commentators have suggested that these behaviors are con-
sistent with norms of reciprocity. 3 Those norms are often mediated 
by powerful and elemental emotions or moral "sentiments" that 
appear to be widespread and deeply ingrained features of human 
psychology.4 
Although there is reason to believe that a concern with recip-
rocal obligations is widespread in human societies, there may well 
be a disparity between social arrangements that command popular 
assent and those that can be ethically justified on first principles. 
Some liberal theorists who seek to formulate basic rules for the 
2 See Amy L. Wax, Rethinking Welfare Rights: Reciprocity Norms, Reactive Atti-
tudes, and the Political Economy of Welfare Reform, 63 Law & Contemp. Probs. 257. 
266-68 (2000). For an exposition of the empirical psychology of reciprocal relations, see 
Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity, 
14 J. Econ. Persp. 159, 159 (2000) (arguing that "[p]eople repay gifts and take revenge 
even in interactions with complete strangers and even if it is costly for them and yields 
neither present nor future material rewards.") (emphasis omitted); Ernst Fehr & Simon 
Gachter, Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments, 90 Am. Econ . Rev. 
980, 980 (2000) (noting that "those who cooperate may be willing to punish free-riding, 
even if this is costly to them and even if they cannot expect future benefits from their 
~unishment activities."). 
See Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Is Equality Passe? Homo Reciprocans and the 
Future of Egalitarian Politics, Boston Rev., Dec.-Jan. 1999, at 4, 4. See also Robert H. 
Frank, Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions 36 (1988); Stuart 
White, Review Article: Social Rights and the Social Contract - Political Theory and the 
New Welfare Politics, 30 Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 507,513-14 (2000). 
4 See Bowles & Gintis, supra note 3, at 4. 
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composition of just societies do make some use of the concept of 
reciprocity, although too often at a frustratingly high level of ab-
straction. John Rawls, for example, describes the just society as 
one of reciprocal cooperation among equals. 5 He acknowledges 
citizens' obligations "to contribute to joint enterprises from which 
they have benefited and in which they are in some sense partici-
pants."6 David Gauthier is more explicit in refusing to recognize 
collective obligations towards social actors who cannot participate 
in voluntary exchange relationships. 7 Rawls' and Gauthier's con-
tractarian approaches to justice have been criticized for failing to 
find a place for those incapable of making the kinds of positive 
contribution to the collective enterprise that might elicit a corre-
sponding sense of obligation from others. How do those who are 
less than fully capable of participating in a joint productive enter-
prise fit into a "just" scheme of reciprocal cooperation and ex-
change?8 
An alternative line of attack on reciprocity as a governing 
principle for social organization is grounded in an egalitarian cri-
tique of the concept of deservingness and "desert-based" alloca-
tions generally. 9 Any demand that individuals make some sacrifice 
or positive contribution before resources will be forthcoming from 
others or from the group necessarily generates a distinction be-
tween those who "deserve" public assistance and those who do 
5 See Rex Martin, Rawls's New Theory of Justice, 69 Chi .-Kent L. Rev. 737, 750-51 
~1994). 
Lawrence C. Becker, Reciprocity 36I (I986). 
7 See David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement 268 (1986) (stating that " [a]nimals, the 
unborn, the congenitally handicapped and defective, fall beyond the pale of a morality 
tied to mutuality."). 
8 See, e.g., Eva Feder Kittay, Love' s Labor: Essays on Women , Equality, and Depend-
ency 76 (1999) (commenting on Rawls' s treatment of dependency); Martha Nussbaum, 
Disabled Lives: Who Cares? N.Y. Rev. Books, Jan. II, 2001, at 36 (noting Kittay ' s as-
sertion that Rawls "explicitly omits from the situation of basic political choice the more 
extreme forms of need and dependency that human beings may experience."); Allen Bu-
chanan, Justice as Reciprocity versus Subject-Centered Justice, 19 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 227, 
232 (1990) (criticizing Gauthier's belief that moral rights "are rationally ascribable only 
to potential contributors to social wealth."). But cf. Brian Barry, Theories of Justice 244-
46 (1989) (suggesting that Rawls's just society does recogr:ize obligations to the depend-
ent and disabled). 
9 For more on the concept of deservingness, see generally Richard J . Arneson , Egali-
tarianism and the Undeserving Poor, J. Pol. Phil. 327 (1997) (arguing that a proper the-
ory of justice needs to take into account the norms of individual responsibility and de-
servi ngness). 
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not. Yet, according to some theorists, the concept of "desert" is it-
self suspect, because the ability and willingness to contribute to 
the social product , and the degree to which an individual is re-
garded as making a valuable contribution, depend ultimately on 
arbitrary factors-such as individual endowments, patterns of con-
sumer demand , and natural scarcities-for which individuals can-
not justly be held responsible. 10 In addition, it has been maintained 
that there is no consistent and universal yardstick for determining 
just terms of exchange and no obviously correct rule for fi.xing the 
amount and nature of contributions that warrant particular rewards 
from others within a cooperative framework. 11 In the absence of 
centralized direction, allocations of joint product are determined 
by spontaneous bargaining within the group. But the outcome of 
real life bargaining cannot provide the basis for answering the 
normative question of which allocations are fair or comport with 
defensible ethical principles. In the face of such wide variation in 
terms of exchange and measures of social value, how can we know 
what recompense for a particular effort or contribution is just? 
The struggle to answer these questions is central to liberal po-
litical theory. John Rawls, for example, devotes a good deal of at-
tention to them, but provides ambiguous answers. 12 On the one 
hand he speaks of reciprocity as the bedrock of a just system. 13 On 
the other, he attacks the notion that people "deserve" the economic 
rewards they can earn within a free market, even when those re-
wards are the outgrowth of considerable effort. 14 He never ex-
pressly demands that social participants expend any kind of effort 
as a condition of eligibility for social assistance, nor does he ex-
plicitly restrict the "least well off' class that is entitled to re-
10 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson, What is the Point of Eq!.!ality?, I 09 Ethics 287, 
289-95 ( 1999) (discussing the range of views among "luck egalitarians" about the ac-
tions and consequences for which persons can fairly be held responsible); Samuel Schef-
fler, Justice and Desert in Liberal Theory, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 965, 973-78 (2000) (discuss-
ing Rawls's views on desert) ; Samuel Scheffler, Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes, and 
Liberalism in Philosophy and Politics, 21 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 299, 305-06 (1992) (same). 
11 See, e.g. , Andrew Levine, Rewarding Effort, 7 J. Pol. Phil. 404, 409-11 (1999) (ar-
guing that there is no feasible way to do the requisite moral accounting to justify income 
inequalities). 
12 See Rawls, supra note 1, at 310-15 (discussing "legitimate expectations and moral 
desert"). 
l3 See id. at 311 (noting that a "just scheme ... answers to what men are entitled to; it 
satisfies their legitimate expectations as founded upon social institutions"). 
14 See id. at 311-12. 
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sources under his proposed rrummax or "difference principle" 
scheme only to those who have at some time contributed, or at-
tempted to contribute, to the social surplus. And, contrary to some 
critiques, he never expressly excludes from help those who are 
wholly incapable of contributing. 15 Indeed, the requirements of ef-
fort expended or positive contribution-in the form of past or pre-
sent work, for example-play very little role in Rawls's exposition 
of the principles of justice, except perhaps in his concern with 
equal opportunity. 16 
Interestingly, ordinary people appear much more concerned 
with the concrete questions that Rawls finesses. What is the nature 
of the contribution expected from each member of a just society, 
and under what conditions should it be forthcoming? To whom is 
he lp owed from collective resources, and under what circum-
stances? Public opinion appears to have anticipated many of these 
conceptual difficulties. 17 
Popular attitudes have at least something to say on the problem 
of defining the precise nature and magnitude of the contribution 
that would entitle social actors to assistance from others, whether 
through private channels or collectively through government. 
There is robust suppmt for fundamental norms of self-reliance that 
oblige able-bodied persons to work to support themselves and that 
15 Cf. Kittay, supra note 8, at 76 (noting that Rawls has joined other authors "who 
have omitted responsibility for dependents from, or relegated it to the periphery of, the 
political."). See also Barry, supra note 8, at 243-44 (suggesting that the disabled and the 
dependent would certainly be included in the class of the "less-well-off'). 
l6 For a more extensive discussion, see Amy L. Wax, Something for Nothing: the Lib-
eral Case Against Welfare Work Requirements (preliminary draft on file with author). 
See also, e.g., Edmund Phelps, Delivering a Basic Income, Boston Rev., Oct.-Nov. 
2000, at 12. Rawls derives the "maximin" principle, which is concerned primarily with 
the redistribution of "primary social goods," after he establishes a set of fundamental 
principles of individual rights, which include the right to seek to attain gainful positions 
open to all. See Rawls , supra note l, at 83-90, 150-61. But Phelps notes that Rawls says 
little about what happens to those who neither seek nor obtain employment. See Phelps, 
supra. However, in later work Rawls implies that, because leisure is a primary good, 
those who are voluntarily idle would probably not qualify as among the least well off 
because they would be endowed with an ample measure of society's resources by virtue 
of their plethora of free time. See Phillippe Van Parijs, Why Should Surfers Be Fed: The 
Liberal Case for an Unconditional Basic Income, 20 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 101, 101 (1991) 
(citing John Rawls, The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good, 17 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 
257 n.7 (1988)). 
17 For more details regarding popular views of welfare and redistributive programs, 
see Wax, supra note 2, at 271-74. 
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charge those who receive public assistance with the duty to re-
spond in kind by making (or having at so me point made) contri-
butions. That principle is grounded in an abhorrence of free-riding , 
which can be defined, albeit crudely, as receiv ing benefits without 
contributing enough in return. But popular opinion does not view 
unvarnished reciproci ty as a complete theory of soc ial relations. 
Rather, the duty to contribute accrues only to those who are capa-
ble of contributing. 18 Most people thus reject a narrow view of 
reciprocity that demands actual contribution as the price fo r coop-
eration and ass istance in favor of a code of economic redistribu-
tion that embraces a broader notion of conditional reciprocity. 
The principle of conditional reciprocity addresses head on the 
problem of individuals who, by virtue of their meager abilities or 
incapacities, are not invited to participate in voluntary economic 
exchanges and can make no net contribution to the social surplus. 
It also has something to say about the vexed question of the terms 
of exchange by suggesting what might count as a sufficient contri-
bution to wan·ant an entitlement to public resources and collective 
support. The short answer on both counts-albeit one requiring 
further elaboration for real world application in myriad circum-
stances-is that the duty to contribute attaches only to those who 
are able to expend productive effort, and only to a degree that is 
reasonable in light of the person' s abilities and endowments as 
well as social practices and conventions relating to work. There is 
a general consensus that the disabled, the young, and many of the 
elderly are entitled to at least partial support from the public be-
cause they are dependent through no fault of their own. 19 Indi-
viduals not falling into these categories must ordinarily abide by 
the conventional expectation of full-time effort in the labor mar-
ket. In other words, everyone else is expected to work for a living 
unless they have a special reason to be exempted. This expectation 
is consonant with widespread popular support for the moralistic 
distinction between deserving and undeserving recipients of public 
aid, with "desert" determined by whether someone contributes as 
much to his own economic support as he reasonably can. Volun-
tary noncompliance with these expectations defeats entitlement to 
18 See id. at 268-69. 
19 See id. at 270-71. Attitudes toward the elderly carry some nuance. Despite the abil-
ity of some elderly people to support themselves through work, they are generally 
viewed as entitled to a peri od of rest after a prolonged lifetime of labor. 
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public help. Involuntary noncompliance preserves it. 
I have speculated elsewhere that the widespread unwillingness 
to assist individuals viewed as depending unnecessarily on public 
resources represents a modern expression of innate or learned psy-
chological attitudes with widespread currency across human so-
cieties. 20 Those attitudes evolved to help facilitate the develop-
ment of systems of reciprocal aiel during remote periods of human 
history. I speculate that evolution favored individuals able to form 
stable " insurance" collectives designed to assist community mem-
bers in times of emergency or distress. In the absence of a cen-
tralized authority to collect resources from the group by force, the 
stability and cohesion of such arrangements would tend to depend 
on a strong norm of reciprocity that demanded contributions from 
able-bodied citizens, reserved aid only to victims of bad luck, and 
punished opportunism. This account rests on the assumption that 
participating in successful collectives of this type, although ulti-
mately more beneficial to some members than others, actuarially 
enhanced the "fitness" of all members of the group.21 On this as-
sumption, the model predicts that evolutionary pressures would 
favor the development and retention of the moral sentiments 
needed to sustain the cohesive norms upon which these arrange-
ments depend, including a strong antipathy to "freeloaders." The 
theory is that the desirability of erecting systems for mutual sup-
port against misfortune, and the need to guard against freeloaders 
that threaten to undermine the stability of such ventures, has led to 
the development of an ethos of conditional reciprocity that incor-
porates a strong antipathy to those who depend unnecessarily on 
public support and that sharply distinguishes between those who 
can pay their own way and those who are afflicted with incapaci-
ties or special needs that require them to depend on others for 
sustenance. 
This distinction, although fairly precise in the abstract, leaves 
many issues unresolved in practice. As noted, conditional reci-
20 See id. at 266-67. 
21 Although this assumption may hold on a straightforward individual fitness para-
digm, it almost certainly makes more sense to analyze these arrangements using more 
sophisti cated models of group fitness, or group-enhancing altruistic behavior. See gener-
ally Elliott Sober & David Sloan Wilson, Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of 
Unselfish Behavior ( 1998) (theorizing that the development of certain altruistic behav-
iors serves an evolutionary purpose, consistent with Darwin's idea of group selection). 
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procity does dictate a fairly definite stance towards the profoundly 
disabled and the abjectly dependent by recognizing clear collective 
obligations to those who, through no fault of their own, will never 
be able to generate any significant resources for themselves. By 
attaching the condition of involuntariness, an ethos built on the 
distinction between the deserving and undeserving finds a place 
for those who would appear to be outside the circle of cooperation 
and exchange without giving up on the core universal obligation to 
contribute to others' well-being or to joint social product that lies 
at the heart of the concept of reciprocity. But establishing the un-
derstanding that conditional reciprocity does not require a positive 
contribution from everyone-and accepting that certain persons 
will be dependent on the rest of us at the extremes-does not come 
close to resolving many key questions that might arise about what 
a system built on conditional reciprocity does affirmatively re-
quire. The terms in which a principle of conditional reciprocity is 
expressed, both by ordinary people and by sophisticated theorists, 
are inherently ambiguous~2 The precept that people should work if 
they are able and make contributions if they can begs many ques-
tions about how to define "work" and about what qualifies as 
"making a contribution." Specifically, do we adopt a notion of 
work that looks to the effort the worker expends, the "disutili ty" or 
unpleasantness he suffers, the sacrifice he makes, or the value or 
benefit he produces for others?23 The answers are complicated by 
the fact that the ability to work or work productively is not a mat-
ter of all or nothing. There is also the question of how much 
weight to place on market measures of value in preference to non-
market-based criteria. A person might be able to engage in effort-
ful or productive activity, but be unable to perform a job available 
in the paid economy. He may not be able to command a sufficient 
reward on the paid labor market to support himself and his de-
pendents, or he may engage exclusively in activities that are nor-
mally performed outside the market (such as family care and do-
mestic work). Alternatively, a person may elect to "work" (in the 
22 See. e.g., William A. Galston, What About Reciprocity?, Boston Rev., Oct.-Nov. 
2000, at 9 (defining reciprocity as "the simple but profound idea that people who receive 
benefits should make contributions-if they are able."). 
23 See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, Doing & Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility 
89-90 (1970) (suggesting that income may be deserved as a social recognition of excel-
lence or achievement, or as gratitude for contributions made to the economic welfare or 
"standard of living"). 
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sense of expending positive effort), but not in a way that appears 
to benefit others or that produces what others value. Consider, for 
example, the third rate ar1ist who chooses to spend all day in his 
garage laboring mightily over paintings that no one wants. How 
does conditional reciprocity deal with these situations?24 
Addressing these situations is essential to putting reciprocal in-
sights to work in designing programs for the real world. The re-
mainder of this essay will be devoted to such real world programs. 
It will critically examine features of the American social welfare 
system, and especially recent reforms introduced by the enactment 
of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act25, 
in light of the principles of conditional reciprocity articulated 
above. The essay will argue that, although the policies in place go 
some distance towards vindicating reciprocity principles, more 
could be done to square the system with these ideals. The govern-
ment should provide more generous work subsidies for low-wage 
workers and better care for children of the working poor. While 
retaining work requirements, it should deliberately modify those 
requirements to accommodate the demands of parenthood. It 
should extend the five-year lifetime limit on welfare payments for 
selected recipients while continuing to make public support condi-
tional on performing work of some kind, including, as a last resort, 
publicly created "workfare" type jobs. It should modify pre-
existing in-kind benefits programs that provide housing and food 
assistance more explicitly to favor workers over non-workers. It 
should stress and expand funding for flexible and creative pro-
grams like transportation loans, "supported work" assistance, and 
short-term emergency relief, which help workers obtain and keep 
their jobs. Finally, it should establish minimally adequate health 
benefits for employees and their families. 
III. SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF A RECIPROCAL WELFARE 
SYSTEM 
The fundamental idea behind a reciprocity-based welfare sys-
tem is that assistance is owed to those who contribute if they are 
able and to those who fail to contribute if they are not. Because 
people differ widely in their capacity for self-sufficiency-and be-
24 For more on these issues, see Wax, supra note 16. 
25 Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 110, 110 Stat. 2l 05 ( 1996). 
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cause many low-wage workers earn too little to support them-
selves-this principle amounts to recognizing the community's 
duty to make up any shortfall between what persons can command 
on their own in the market or through private anangements and an 
amount sufficient to support a minimally decent standard of living. 
In effect the government undertakes to act as surety for a basic 
standard of living on condition the that "insured" make a reason-
able effort to contribute to their own self-support through some 
kind of work or through an alliance with someone who agrees to 
provide support. 
As noted, the rule as stated tracks the traditional distinction 
between the deserving and undeserving poor without resolving all 
questions about who deserves assistance and how much. The cen-
terpiece of such a system must be welfare work requirements for 
the "able-bodied"-that is, for those who are capable of perform-
ing tasks in the paid economy. But this definition suggests an im-
mediate line of attack: If there are just not enough jobs to go 
around, then is it not unfair to throw everyone who is not working 
off the welfare rolls or to hold everyone to the demand for work as 
a condition of receiving benefits? And even if there are jobs avail-
able, what if many do not quality for those jobs due to inadequate 
training and education or lack of talent? Finally, what about moth-
ers of small children? Do they belong in the category of the "able-
bodied?" Are they not "working" enough to discharge their obli-
gations to the collective? Decisions about how to structure actual 
benefits programs require some resolution of these questions. 
A. Structural Unemployment 
The first objection based on structural unemployment is indeed 
weighty even within the terms of the reciprocity paradigm itself. 
But it does not follow from the existence of some residual unem-
ployment in the economy that work requirements should be abol-
ished. As long as there is reason to believe that many persons on 
welfare really could do more to support themselves, work re-
quirements can be used to vindicate reciprocity principles. The job 
market under welfare reform functions like a game of musical 
chairs: as recipients scramble to comply with new demands by 
seeking employment, more and more obtain jobs and more jobs 
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are filled. 26 By hypothesis, a few people will eventually end up 
without jobs, but it is impossible to know who those people will be 
at the outset of the game. Imposing meaningful work require-
ments, after decades of failure to do so, starts the music. Only after 
many rounds are played and all seats are filled will it become clear 
which players are left standing. The problem is that the reformist 
pressures that cause the game to be played in earnest seem essen-
tial to sorting this out. The "undeserving" cannot be effectively 
wrung from the system without playing a game that can only end 
with some unfortunate stragglers left seat-less. Those stragglers 
cannot be regarded as "undeserving" in the sense that smneone 
must be left behind. The paradox is that , as the process accom-
plishes its purpose, the system becomes less and less fair to the 
"hard core" of those remaining. This suggests that, depending on 
economic background conditions, welfare work requirements, al-
though consistent with reciprocity norms up to a point, may stand 
in tension with them over time. When we arrive at the point that 
the only people left on the rolls are those who, despite repeated 
threats of loss of benefits and apparent good faith efforts, are still 
not complying with work requirements, it will become increas-
ingly difficult to maintain those requirements for all seemingly 
"able-bodied" individuals. The poor relief provisions of the wel-
fare reform statute, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
("TANF"),27 do permit states to exempt up to one-fifth of their 
caseloads from work requirements28 and, in the cases of "hard-
ship" or domestic violence, from the 5-year lifetime limit on fed-
erally funded benefits. 29 States are not required to make use of 
these safety-valve exemptions, and only some have invoked them 
for work requirements. Because lifetime limits on benefits are yet 
to kick in for most states, it remains to be seen whether and how 
states will elect to take advantage of the 20% rule for time limits 
by exempting their most recalcitrant, resistant, or unfortunate 
cases. If some core of the welfare caseload, despite reasonable ef-
forts, seems unable to obtain and hold a job for any sustained pe-
26 See Robert Pear, Far More Single Mothers Are Taking Jobs, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 
2000, § 1, at 28. 
27 For a good overview of the features of the T ANF block grant, see Helen Hershkoff 
& Stephen Loffredo, The Rights of the Poor: The Authmitative ACLU Guide to Poor 
People 's Rights 32-54 (1997). 
"l8 ~ 
~ See Wax, supra note 2, at 286. 
29 Sec 42 U.S.C. §608(a)(7) (1998). 
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riod, it can be argued that the conditional reciprocity norm re-
quires that some provision be made for those individuals by ex-
empting them from strict time limits. Maintaining the integrity of 
the reciprocity ideal requires that the exempt population consist 
only of those who are truly unable to work despite best efforts. 
The task of insuring that the exempt "deserve" their exemption 
will always be difficult and prone to enor. Thus, although such 
exemptions may be necessary, their existence will always threaten 
to undermine the credibility of any work-based scheme, both for 
taxpayers who fund welfare and for recipients who must decide 
how seriously to take its requirements. 
B. Time Limits on Welfare Benefits 
One possible solution to the time-limits problem would be to 
permit states to "stop the clock" on the five- year federal lifetime 
limit while individuals are working and receiving benefits simul-
taneously, as often occurs under generous state earnings ' disregard 
rules. 30 This suggestion is appealing from the point of view of 
reciprocity: individuals who exert a reasonable effort within the 
workplace are by definition fulfilling the requirements of a condi-
tionally reciprocal scheme. The quid pro quo for that effort is 
enough support from the government to bring the person up to a 
minimally decent standard of living. The support could take the 
form of a cash welfare check or "subsidy," suitably calibrated to 
reflect the person's own work contribution. The payment would 
continue indefinitely as long as the person was in need despite 
putting in a substantial work effort. In effect, the five-year lifetime 
limit on "welfare" would only apply to money received while the 
beneficiary was not complying adequately with some kind of wel-
fare work requirement. Compliance would establish a reciprocal 
basis for some kind of ongoing assistance. 31 
One problem with this proposal is that it effectively seeks to 
establish a permanent subsidized or supported work regime for 
former welfare beneficiaries. But people who are trying to satisfy 
30 See Dan Bloom and Robert Rector, Remarks at the New World of Welfare Confer-
ence, sponsored by the Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan in Wash-
ington, D.C. (Feb. 1-2, 2001) (conference notes on file with author) . 
31 Alternatively, states could effectively stop the federal clock during periods of subs i-
dized work by using state funds to support welfare- to-work transitions. 
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welfare work requirements or leave welfare altogether are not the 
only ones in need of income supports. Some persons who have 
never been on welfare earn just as little as those who are making 
the transition from welfare to work, and it is unfair to subsidize the 
latter indefinitely by tolling the clock on welfare time limits, while 
ignoring those who cannot take advantage of welfare-based work 
subsidies because they have never sought ass istance. The so lution 
to this problem is to establish a unified scheme that draws in eve-
ryone who makes an inadequate income despite something like 
full-time work effort. Consistency suggests that we should either 
expand welfare to allow everyone with a substandard wage to join 
the welfare-as-perpetual-work-subsidy bandwagon, or we should 
continue to view welfare-plus-work as a limited, transitional stop-
gap and create non-welfare based, comprehensive, supported work 
programs, such as a negative income tax or a wage subsidy, which 
are designed to boost the earnings of the lowest wage workers 
over the long haul. 
C. Lack of Job Skills 
The discussion so far prompts a closer examination of the 
question of what it means to be "unable" to work. Does it mean 
that one cannot get hired in the current environment, or that one 
lacks and is unable to obtain the skills necessary to get hired? A 
related objection to work requirements and time-limits-that many 
of the nonworking poor, although seemingly capable of perform-
ing productive tasks, just will not be hired into the jobs employers 
need doing-requires a more complex analysis within the reci-
procity framework. One way of looking at this problem is as a 
variation on the theme of structural unemployment, but with an 
emphasis on worker-job mismatch rather than just the sheer lack 
of enough jobs to put everyone to work. But this raises the ques-
tion of why this mismatch exists. Why do some jobs go begging 
when there is a residual army of unemployed? Can individuals be 
held responsible for this, or is it a fact beyond their control? Much 
depends on how we define "able-bodied." Persons without obvi-
ous physical or mental disabilities seem capable of engaging in 
some kind of productive activity-that is, they would appear to be 
able to create economic value by dint of exerting some effort. Al-
though persons may seem perfectly capable of performing some 
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so rt of productive task, that does not mean they are equipped to 
"produce" on the job market as it actually exists . This discussion 
shows that terms like "productivity" and "able-bodied" are am-
biguous. These terms can be used to refer to the capacity to gener-
ate gross output without regard to the costs of producing that out-
put. or to net output of work taking into account the cost of 
making that work poss ible. Alternatively, they can refer to output 
and effort without regard to whether the products benefit anyone 
e lse . Some people's effo rt s do not yield much of value or not 
enough to make it economically feasible to employ them in actual 
jobs at mandated levels of compensation. Some may not be worth 
emp loying at any level of compensation. 32 This may be due to lack 
of ability, intellectual or otherwise, or for reasons related to a 
worker 's character, habits, demeanor, or behavior. Intellect and 
other forms of raw ability can be regarded as fixed endowments 
for which individuals are not responsible, but they can also be 
viewed as attributes that are developed, up to a point, through ef-
fort and wise choices. On the former view, persons who cannot fill 
available jobs because of personal deficiencies should arguably be 
treated the same as those who are "disabled" in more familiar 
ways. In other words, low ability should be assimilated to "dis-
ability." Our resistance to such an equation may relate to the diffi-
culty of distinguishing low ability from the consequences of the 
individual' s past or present failure to develop whatever potential 
abilities he or she possesses . It is always possible to ask whether 
someone is "unable" to do a particular job--or any available job--
because of raw and ineluctable defects in talent or intellect, or be-
cause of the "voluntary" failure to develop potential in ways that 
would enhance employability. The response to this difficulty and 
the moral hazard it creates is to refuse, at least formally, to excuse 
those with "mere" incompetence from contributing through work 
unless their deficits are extreme to the point of representing a well-
defined and medically recognized syndrome, such as mental retar-
dation or a psychiatric disease. 
32 Under ideal neoclassical theory, the wages offered to low-productivity workers 
should sink to retlect their value to the employer. There are many reasons, however, why 
this might not happen, or why low-productivity workers might not enter the labor market 
even if wages were lowered- reasons that stem from labor market deviations from the 
ideal and from the distortions introduced by government regul ation. On the proble ms of 
low-wage labor markets, see Edmund S. Phelps, Rewarding Work: How to Restore Par-
ticipation and Self-Support to Free Enterprise 16-48 ( 1997). 
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D. Single j\;fo therhood 
Yet another difficulty confronting a reciprocal welfare system 
concerns the expectations for those who exert their efforts out side 
the paid economy-especially mothers of minor children and sin-
g le mothers with no reliable source of private suppol1 . The treat-
ment of mothers under a system governed by principles of condi-
tional reciprocity is extremely complex. There are several issues 
that need to be resolved in deciding whether or to what extent 
reciproc it y principles demand that mothers work in the paid eco n-
omy, that they provide all or most of the suppot1 for themse lves 
and their children, or that they be viewed as entitled to substantia l 
or complete assistance from society as a whole. The fir st issue is 
the extent to which women 's effort as mothers, albeit exerted out-
side the paid labor market , should be regarded as discharging rea-
sonable work requirements that trigger reciprocal obligations on 
the part of society as a whole. Much has been written, especially 
by feminist scholars, about society 's obligation to support 
women's caretaking function, 33 but the precise bas is of this obli-
gation is unclear. To be sure, childrearing is "work" in the sense 
that it requires the exertion of effort on the part of the caretaker 
and confers some benefit on the child. But that does not answer 
the question of whether society is obligated to pay full freight for 
motherhood, or whether full-time mothers' obligations to exert 
reasonable effort s towards self-support are to be regarded as dis-
charged. 
Support for single mothers is often justified by the assertion 
that all of society benefits when women devote themselves to the 
caretaking function. 34 In effect, society is only paying for what it 
gets. But, as I have argued elsewhere, that rationale is not suffi-
33 See, e.g. , Shirley P. Burggraf, The Femj nine Economy and Economic Man: Revi v-
ing the Role of Family in the Post-Industrial Age, ix (1997) (noting European efforts to 
mitigate childrearing cos ts with daycare subsidies or child allowances) ; Martha Albert-
son Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family, and Other Twen tieth Century 
Tragedies 9 (1995) (arguing that society fail s to value caretakers);Kittay, supra note 8, at 
I (discussing the issue of "who provides the support for the relationsrup of care and for 
both parties to the caring relationship") . 
34 See Wax, supra note 2, at 278 (stating that child-rearing generates "public goods" 
by producing "good citizens"); Amy L. Wax, Caring Enough: Sex Roles, Work and 
Taxing Women, 44 Viii. L. Rev. 495,513 ( 1999) (noting that "children grow up to be 
industrious, law-abiding, sober, moral, conscientious, creative, educated and skill ed cit i-
zens. ") . 
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cient to just ify an obligation of complete support for caretakers 
and their children, because most of the efforts expended by parents 
and caretakers redound to the benefit of private individu als-that 
is, the parents themselves and the children. 35 The collective enjoys 
only a small part of the payoff from reproductive and caretaking 
work in the form of the public good of well-behaved, law abiding, 
productive citizens. 36 These positive externalities, which are not 
captured exclusively by the individual parents and children but are 
shared by all, should by rights be compensated by the collective. 37 
But that reasoning justifies, at most, a modest and partial subsidy 
for child rearing. Considerations tied to the true "exchange value" 
of the benefit received cannot justify society paying the full freight 
for single mothers and their children. 38 
But conditional reciprocity does not demand that the person 
who is receiving help from the group actually return something in 
kind that is equal to the value of collective support. On the con-
trary, it is assumed that some will contribute more to the common 
pool of resources than they receive and vice versa. The whole 
point of the welfare system is to smooth out such differences by 
insuring that those who are unable to provide enough for their own 
needs are brought up to the baseline by the group, so long as they 
comply with the requirement to make reasonable efforts to con-
tribute to the social product. But on that view, how should the is-
sue of single motherhood--or motherhood in general-be ap-
proached? Any attempt to answer this question must be made in 
light of the understanding that the standard a society sets for a suf-
ficient contribution to satisfy the requirements of conditional reci-
procity cannot be completely arbitrary. Rather, the duty imposed 
35 See Wax, supra note 2, at 278 (noting that a mother's childrearing efforts yi eld 
"consumption value" to the parents and benefi t the child through "an altruistic gift of 
care") ; Wax, supra note 33, at 514 (positing that parents ' satisfaction in having and rais-
ing children, and children's enjoyment of the fruits of their developed human capital , 
outweigh any benefits of childrearing for third parties). 
36 See Wax, supra note 33, at 513; AmyL. Wax, Is There a Caring Crisis?, 16 Yale J. 
on Reg. 327, 345 (1999) (reviewing Shirley P. Burggraf, The Feminine Economy and 
Economic Man: Reviving the Role of the Family in the Postindustrial Age (2d ed. 1999). 
37 But see Eric Rakowski , Equal Justice 153-54 (1991) (suggesting that society owes 
no compensation to parents for producing the next generation, because these benefits are 
thrust on society unrequested). 
38 See Wax, supra note 2, at 278 (arguing that "it seems unlikely that the collective 
would come out ahead overall from underwriting the support for all single women with 
children who choose to avail themselves of help. "). 
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upon the "able-bodied" is to strive for self-sufficiency. But if a 
person chooses an activity that causes her to fall shorter of that 
goal than if she applied her efforts in a different direction, then so-
ciety would do well to judge that effort insufficient. Surely a soci-
ety is under no obligation to support a third-rate artist who chooses 
to spend his days churning out paintings in his garage if those 
paintings are of little value to anyone but the artist himself, as evi-
denced by the fact that no one wants to buy them. Perhaps the art-
ist might be regarded as discharging his duty if the stream of third-
rate paintings is the best the artist could do, since conditional reci-
procity demands only that someone contribute as much as he is 
reasonably able. But most artists can do more to support them-
selves either by dividing their efforts between art and paid em-
ployment or by abandoning art altogether. In general, conditional 
reciprocity does not recognize a collective obligation to support 
members' decisions to engage in any work of their choosing if that 
choice will make them dependent on group support and another 
position available to them would not. It is true that almost every-
one could work harder and generate more income than they al-
ready do. And there is no generally held expectation that people 
make as much money as they can regardless of the effort or exer-
tion involved. But there is no inconsistency in the demand that 
people do more for themselves only up to a point, because the 
group is naturally more concerned with those who seek public 
subsidization than with those who do not. The rule appears to be 
roughly that persons should strive for self-sufficiency if the effort 
required is within the realm of reason, with the standard for rea-
sonable exertion informed by conventional expectations and by 
what most people do. And the customary expectation is to make 
the most palatable of available choices that permits the attainment 
of economic independence through reasonable efforts, even if the 
person would really rather be doing something less lucrative. 
Why might societies tend to adopt self-sufficiency as a strong 
baseline norm? To apply a more lenient rule would invite every-
one to choose the most desirable and pleasant form of employment 
regardless of compensation on the expectation that the group 
would make up the difference. But if everyone accepted that invi-
tation, the difference could not be made up. Since insurance col-
lectives must be at pains to avoid this destabilizing moral hazard, 
it comes as no surprise that societies will regard with suspicion or 
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even hostility anyone who seeks voluntarily to exempt himself 
from the baseline expectation of economic self-support. 
To summarize, although a strong dose of convention governs 
the determination of what counts as enough exertion or contribu-
tion to give rise to a reciprocal obligation for ass istance if needed, 
the conventions are always informed by the interests of the group. 
The previous analysis suggests why self-sufficiency (that is, the 
generation of enough resources to obviate the need for help from 
the group) will always serve as a powerful normative baseline 
from which deviations will be viewed with disfavor and will invite 
scrutiny. Nonetheless, economic conditions and social custom will 
always color the determination of whether enough etiort towards 
the goal of self-sufficiency has been exerted in any given case. It 
will matter how hard most people actually work within a given so-
ciety at a particular time, which will in tum depend on how hard 
most people have to work to attain independence. Thus, the will-
ingness to help people in different populations and with different 
characteristics may vary with time and circumstances. 
The forgoing analysis sheds important light on the question of 
public support for single mothers. Although the duty of self-
sufficiency has always been the starting point, there was a time 
when motherhood alone exempted a woman from that expecta-
tion.39 The reasons for that exemption were rooted in custom, law, 
practice, and social organization. Women were viewed as inher-
ently dependent and therefore no women were expected to be self-
supporting; all were the charge of some man. 40 If private depend-
ency failed, the state took over. But those attitudes have changed 
radically, and so have the conditions that went with them. The op-
portunities for women to generate significant resources in the la-
bor market have greatly expanded, and economic independence is 
now common among mothers and non-mothers alike. Indeed, to-
day, many single and married mothers in all social classes either 
support themselves or make significant efforts in the paid labor 
market to contribute to their families' support. Those facts will in-
evitably affect society's attitudes towards assisting single mothers 
39 See Linda Gordon, Pitied But Not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Wel-
fare 1890-1935, at 20 (1994) ; Mimi Abramovitz, Regulating the Lives of Women: Soci al 
Welfare Policy from Colonial Times to the Present 3 (1988). 
40 See Gordon, supra note 38, at 20; Abramovitz, supra note 38, at 52-54. 
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with children. But that shift is not a mere arbitrary contingency. 
Rather, it fo llows quite directly from the log ic of rec iprocity as it 
applies to present economic reality. Under a reciprocity paradigm, 
the change in expectations for women and mothers in response to 
social practice is essential to the maintenance of horizontal equity 
and the discouragement of free riding, which are both central ele-
ments of a reciprocity-based structure. Within a cooperative group 
that has pledged mutual support for all members on condition that 
each person exert a reasonable effort on his own behalf, the fact 
that certain people routinely attain self- sufficiency and do not re-
quest assistance will necessarily give rise to the expectation that 
other similarly situated persons do the same. To permit those with 
similar capacities to make very different contributions to self-
support is to license the kind of mutual exploitation that violates 
the fundamental reciprocity paradigm. That paradigm goes a long 
way towards explaining the present uneasiness with allowing some 
mothers to depend almost entirely on public support while others 
with similar attributes succeed in maintaining greater independ-
ence. 
But the explanation for the present unwillingness to offer 
comprehensive support for single mothers and families rests not 
just on popular expectations about work and self- sufficiency. It 
also stems from understandings about parenthood and reproduc-
tion in our society. The key distinction here is between choice and 
chance: conditional reciprocity recognizes an entitlement to group 
assistance if the need for help stems from events or forces beyond 
the individual' s effective control. But that principle gives rise to a 
series of questions. Is it fair to assume in most cases that becoming 
a mother is a matter of choice rather than luck? If parenthood 
should be viewed as a choice, and if having children makes it dif-
ficult to earn a living by interfering with work or by impeding 
training for work, is that something for which society may fairly 
hold a person responsible? And if so, does the attachment of re-
sponsibility entail a denial of public assistance to single mothers in 
need? Questions of timing are often critical here. To put it more 
precisely: recognizing that past choices to have children can defeat 
present efforts at self-support, does the assignment of responsibil-
ity for those past choices require the denial of present public as-
sistance, despite the potential recipient's current reasonable ef-
forts? 
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The long turning of the tide away from willingness to support 
single parents goes hand-in-hand with a growing consensus that 
the decision whether or not to become a mother is increasingly 
under the individuals' control. Birth control and abortion have be-
come safer, increasingly available, and more reliable. And more 
and more women are actually exerting such control, as evidenced 
by their decisions to delay or limit motherhood or to forgo moth-
erhood entirely. Moreover, not only is there reason to believe that 
choices in this area are often motivated by pragmatic concerns 
such as lack of financial resources, the inability to provide proper 
care due to competing obligations, or the paucity of familial sup-
ports, but taking these considerations into account is considered in 
many quarters to be the socially responsible thing to do. Against a 
set of background conventions and practices that recognize the 
need for "hard choices" based on the ability to provide well for 
children and that locate responsibility for reproductive decisions 
increasingly with the individual, the request for public support as a 
standing entitlement for parents becomes more and more difficult 
to square with the idea of public assistance as insurance against 
bad luck. It generates too much cognitive dissonance for society, 
in allocating resources through redistributive social policy, to sus-
pend the conventional understandings of responsibility for parent-
hood by attributing to chance what is viewed for most people as a 
matter of choice. 
It is interesting, however, that although single mothers have 
increasingly been viewed as "responsible" for their predicament, 
this has not resulted in the denial of all help to mothers either his-
torically or under current welfare law. 41 As noted, the constraints 
imposed by parental responsibilities may undermine the ability to 
achieve self-support through paid work, despite reasonable efforts. 
Parents will find it difficult to work long and irregular hours or to 
engage in protracted periods of training. On a strict view of the 
boundaries between individual and collective responsibility, the 
public would have no duty to mitigate present disabilities or ine-
qualities-including parental disadvantages on the labor market-
that are traceable to past choices with present uncorrectable conse-
41 See Hershkoff & Loffredo, supra note 26, at 33, 44-45, 49-50, 52 (noting that under 
AFDC, benefits for poor unmarried mothers were guaranteed, while under T ANF, single 
mothers may receive benefits if they meet certain eligibility requirements). 
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quences .-+ 2 In allocating responsibility, why should timing matter? 
Nonetheless, the political consensus today would appear to be 
that this position regarding the present consequences of past 
choices is unduly harsh. As a practical matter, we seem willing to 
assist single mothers even if the amount of help they need , or the 
fact that they need any help at all, is a function of unwise past 
choices. And that willingness to disregard the past, and to look ex-
clusively at present self-help efforts, extends beyond the case of 
single mothers to others who have made earlier "mistakes" or im-
prudent decisions that have added to their present needs or to their 
lesser currency on the job market. But a focus on the present and 
future conduct of beneficiaries of assistance is not necessarily in-
consistent with principles of conditional reciprocity. Indeed, that 
stance may in some cases be more consonant with the paradigms 
of group cooperation. 
E. The Role of Past Life Choices 
Although reciprocal systems employ notions of responsibility, 
luck, and agency, the goal is not to enshrine the distinction be-
tween choice and chance for its own sake or to invest it with tal-
ismanic significance divorced from real-world consequences. 
Rather, the norm of reciprocity is best understood as emerging to 
serve the instrumental goal of cementing cooperative arrange-
ments for protecting group members from misfortune and tempo-
rary hard times. The pertinent question to ask in trying to under-
stand how reciprocal norms operate is: how did these collective 
arrangements arise and maintain themselves over time? The quest 
is for rules that will appeal to people as conditional cooperators-
that is, as persons who are willing to do their part so long as they 
are assured that others will too. But, as game theorists who have 
attempted to model reciprocal systems have suggested, stability of 
cooperation does not necessarily depend on shutting out persons 
42 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality 
287-91 (2000) ("In principle .. .indi victuals should be relieved of consequential respon$-
bility for those unfortunate features of their situation that are brute bad luck, but not from 
those that should be seen as t1 owing from their own choices.") ; Rakowski, supra note 36, 
at 73-87 (arguing that inequalities resulting from poor choices are morally unobjection-
able); Anderson, supra note 10, at 291 (describing how "luck egalitarians" believe in an 
equality of opportunity conception of justice rather than an equality of outcome concep-
tion, thus accepting the inequalities that may result from adults' voluntary choi ces) . 
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forever after some temporary failure to conform to cooperati ve 
expectations.-1 3 The practical requirements of a workable system of 
conditional rec iprocity can sometimes be satisfi ed wit hout taking 
such an inflexible view of responsibility. Models of reciproca l co-
operation recognize that these arrangements play themse lves out 
on repeat rounds, in which the willingness of group members to 
cooperate with others often depends on an opposing player ' s most 
immediate moves rather than on actions remote in time.44 Some-
one who defects or ac ts irresponsibly at one point may change 
course and dec ide to cooperate in the present or future. Players re-
serve the right to change their strategies, or players make mistakes. 
If the goal is the widest possible productive participation in a co-
o perative venture, it may sometimes be wiser to incorporate op-
portunities fo r "second chances," "fresh starts," forgiveness , or re-
demption into the game than to adopt a rule of permanent ejection 
fo r past sins. Forgiveness may make sense, for example, if past in-
frac tions do not doom everyone to dependency forever. If past 
norm violators retain the capacity to make positive contributions, 
it may benefit the group to provide them with an ongoing opport u-
nity to demonstrate their willingness to do so. If the group will 
benefit on average or in the long run from a rule that selectively 
ignores past missteps in favor of attention to present and future 
willingness to cooperate, then reciprocal systems may sometimes 
allow more flexibility than an unbending adherence to the logic of 
choice and chance would require . 
How might "second chances" and "fresh starts" work within a 
system of conditional reciprocity? Such a system will be largely 
forward-looking. 45 It will take each person as it finds them-
which will mean, at times, that their capacity for self-support will 
be diminished by irresponsible past choices. It will recognize an 
obligation to help each person achieve a decent standard of living, 
but only if the individual shows a willingness to discharge her 
43 See, e.g., Robert Sugden, The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare 11 2-
15 ( 1986) (noting that, in an "extended pri soner's dilemma" scenario, a stable equilib-
rium resulting from continuing dealing between parties can sometimes be reached even 
in the presence of occasional mistaken defection behavior by the game ' s par ti cipants). 
44 See Wax, supra note 2, at 265 (describing Robert Sugden's Tl strategy associated 
with hi s mutual aid game). 
45 A purely forward-looking system also has the distinct advantage of relieving those 
in charge of administration of the cumbersome and inherently error-ridden task of deter-
mining the precise nature of past circumstances leading to present predicaments. 
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duties on an ongoing basis. So, if a person finds herself unem-
ployed because out -of-wedlock motherhood has led her to drop 
out of school, society will not wash its hands of her. But neither 
will the duty to help be absolute. Rather, it will be made to depend 
on a willingness to behave in a responsible manner from here on 
in. This includes , at a minimum, the willingness to undertake sub-
stantial se lf-help efforts while assistance is provided. It may even 
include a willingness to refrain from bearing more children while 
receiving public assistance, although this demand may sometimes 
be attenuated by a consensus that parents who work are entitled to 
social resources to make up the difference between what they can 
earn and what they need. The scenario of repeated childbearing 
out of wedlock raises the question, under a forgiveness rule, of 
how many past mistakes, resulting in diminished capacity, socie-
ties are bound to overlook. There is probably no definitive answer 
to that question: different societies must decide that case by case, 
with the determination once again informed by conventional un-
derstandings and dominant practices. In general, however, those 
with inabilities and disabilities for which they are entirely blame-
less will advance the least problematic claims. The strict rule that 
need must be clue to bad luck may at times be suspended, because 
a society may choose to overlook past irresponsibility in favor of 
encouraging ongoing cooperative conduct in the future . And so-
cieties may forgive repeated misfeasance up to a point, with the 
tendency to run out of patience as infractions accumulate. 
To sum up: any political collective committed to redistributing 
resources according to reciprocal ideals must strive to accept a 
number of basic understandings about how such a system will 
function. First, the government cannot run welfare programs with-
out making numerous convention-based judgments and without 
setting benchmarks that are inevitably grounded in how most ordi-
nary people are expected to behave and how they do behave. One 
convention that will likely be honored, either for individuals or 
kinship units, is the expectation of economic self-sufficiency. In 
other words, self-sufficiency will be publicly recognized and em-
braced as a normative ideal from which adult individuals are al-
lowed to deviate only for good cause. Second, although some de-
gree of moral hazard is inevitable, the system should be designed 
to minimize it. The rules should be directed at reducing the temp-
tation to exert less than reasonable efforts to contribute to the so-
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cial product. Third, although some initially disadvantaged persons 
will exceed reasonable expectations by dint of exceedingly hard 
work, that standard should not govern for all. The temptation to 
require heroic efforts should be resisted as an unrealistic counsel 
of perfection, especially in light of the trend towards greater fam-
ily fragmentation in society overall. 46 Fourth, it must be assumed 
that the paid economy fails to provide a "living wage" for some 
number of those who work reasonably hard. Fifth, full-time year-
round work should be regarded as a "reasonable effort" for most, 
but something short of that should be the standard, at least ini-
tially, for those who are so unskilled or inexperienced that they 
have chronic difficulties obtaining and holding a job. Sixth, par-
enthood (especially when children are young) should warrant 
some reduction in the amount of labor market effort that suffices 
to establish an entitlement to assistance, and account should be 
taken of parents' special difficulty in holding jobs that require long 
and irregular hours and sudden changes in schedule. Seventh, 
workers should never receive less help and fewer privileges than 
non-workers and should sometimes receive more, unless the non-
workers in question are so disabled that the expectation of em-
ployment of any kind is simply unrealistic. Finally, the govern-
ment must acknowledge that the need for help will not be all or 
nothing. Partial public support may often be appropriate. Indeed, 
partial supplementation and assistance will more often be the rule 
than the exception. A paradigm committed to providing a social 
minimum conditioned on an obligation to contribute productively 
must necessarily recognize quite diverse differences in individual 
ability to generate adequate income through reasonable efforts un-
der existing economic conditions. Not only will capacities and cir-
cumstances vary widely, but fluctuations in labor market opportu-
nities will continually determine how much individuals can 
46 Lawrence Mead notes the successes of some recent immigrant groups, whose fam-
ily members work long hours, and engage in prolonged self-sacrifice, and achieve a high 
degree of family cooperation and stability. See Lawrence M. Mead, The New Politics of 
Poverty: The Nonworking Poor in America 147-48 (1992). This model of hard work and 
family cohesion is very appealing, and it can be argued that failing to accept this model 
as the norm encourages the family breakdown and dissension that plagues less successful 
groups. Nonetheless, the fact remains that this is probably too strenuous an aspiration for 
many of the non-immigrant disadvantaged. Welfare programs need to take some realistic 
account of the needs of fragile families and single parent families that now predominate 
among the poor, while still finding ways to encourage greater family stability and loy-
alty. 
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contribute to their own sustenance. This implies that policies 
should be directed at creating programs that allow the government 
some flex ibility in making up the shortfall between what people 
can do for themselves and what they need to survive in reasonable 
dignity. 
V. APPLYING THE CONDITIONAL RECIPROCITY 
PARADIGM TO WELFARE REFORM 
Given these basic understandings, the challenge is to create 
programs that permit the government to fill the gap between what 
people in different circumstances can reasonably do for them-
selves and what they need to live decently. Work expectations and 
work requirements are the obvious centerpiece. But a wide variety 
of "work supports" should surround these. Work supports can in-
clude in-kind assistance or benefits, tax relief, wage subsidies, and 
programs to help recipients obtain, retain, and cope with employ-
ment. 
Perhaps the two most important forms of in-kind assistance are 
medical care and childcare. For decades , efforts to move signifi-
cant numbers of people from welfare to work were hobbled by 
disincentives created by the loss of medical and child care assis-
tance, which were sometimes made available on more generous 
terms to wholly dependent welfare recipients than to the working 
poor.47 The inversion of that order of support-as it would operate 
in conjunction with strictly enforced work requirements-should 
be made a feature of any welfare system grounded in reciprocal 
ideals. Although eligibility for Medicaid has been expanded re-
cently to cover some of the working poor,48 many workers on the 
lower rungs of the employment ladder lack adequate medical 
benefits. 49 The solution to this problem is not obvious because pri-
47 See Jeff Dickerson, Gradual Welfare Reform; Take Cliffs Out of the Road to Inde-
pendence ; Atlanta J. & Const., Dec. 3, 1996, at 14A. See al so Richard Wertheimer, 
Working Poor Families with Children: Leaving We lfare Doesn't Necessarily Mean 
Leaving Poverty, Child Trends Research Brie f (May 2001 )(noting that in 1998, 70 per-
cent of children in working poor families had health insurance, but 77 percent of children 
in poor families not meeting work requirements had health insurance) . 
48 See Dan Morgan, Expanded Medical Safety Net Still Has Holes, Wash. Post, Feb. 
2 1994, at AI. 
49 See David Brown, Percentage of Uninsured Dropped in 1999; Critics Say Gains in 
Coverage Smaller Than Hoped For in Booming Economy, Wash. Post, Sept. 29, 2000, at 
AS. 
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vate medical insurance is tied to employment. Employers are not 
required to cover many low-wage or part-time workers, and some 
who are offered insurance cannot afford it. 5° Creating a smooth 
interface between government-mandated insurance sc hemes for 
low-wage workers and existing private insurance for better-off 
workers is often difficult because "notch" effects and phase-outs 
create perverse incentives.5 1 A comprehensive recasting of the 
medical care system as a whole may be necessary in the long run. 
But the economics of health insurance suggests that subsidized 
medical benefits will be a key part of any effective scheme of 
·'supported work." 
Another important aspect of supported work is childcare for 
the working poor. Because most low-skilled mothers of young 
children cannot keep jobs without some kind of childcare assis-
tance, welfare reform inevitably pushes government into the child-
care business. The welfare reform statute makes some provisions, 
through a patchwork of programs and funding methods , for the 
care of the children of workers who might otherwise be on wel-
fare . 52 But implementation has been slow and many of the funds 
go unused for lack of initiative, know-how, or adequate supply. 53 
The idea of a greatly expanded, comprehensive national pro-
gram directed at upgrading care for the children of low-wage 
workers fits well with the goals of a welfare system grounded in a 
robust notion of reciprocal obligation. More broadly, a commit-
ment to improving the quality of care that poor children receive 
comports with popular attitudes about the deserving and unde-
serving poor. Although assisting the able- bodied offends our sense 
of justice, so does indifference to those who suffer through no 
50 See Peter T. Kilborn , Uninsured in U.S. Span Many Groups, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 
1999,atA1. 
51 See Daniel Shaviro, The Minimum Wage, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and Op-
timal Subsidy Policy, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 405, 405-11 , 425-26 (1997) (concluding that 
income phaseouts of welfare programs are irrational due to their creation of high mar-
ginal rates in low-income brackets). 
) 2 See Center for Law & Soc. Policy, The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
Block Grant, 4 Georgetown 1. on Fighting Poverty, 311, 312-13 ( 1997). 
53 See Carla Rivera, After-School Plan Gets Mixed Reviews; Care: Ambitious, Free 
Program is Touted as 'Much More Than Baby-sitting.' Critics Say It's Taking Too Long 
to Implement, L.A. Times, Oct. 5, 2000, at B2; Tom Zoellner, Misuse of Day Care 
Funds Denied; S.F. Offici als Defend Deci sion to Send Money Back to Government, S.F. 
Chron. , Mar. 16, 2000, at A21. 
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fault of their own. Children of the poor are not responsible for 
their dilemma: although adults can be undeserving, children inher-
ently cannot be. By insisting that most mothers work, we honor 
the conviction that persons should try to support themselves before 
calling upon public help. But by devoting resources to the children 
of the poor, we recognize our duty to those who cannot be ex-
pected to come to their own aid. Indeed, welfare reform offers a 
golden opportunity for our society to advance two w011hy goals 
simultaneously: encouraging poor mothers to work, and dramati-
cally improving the quality of the care that blamelessly poor chil-
dren receive. 
A recent study by researchers at Yale and the University of 
California at Berkeley reveals that nearly one million toddlers 
have been placed in daycare in the wake of welfare reform as sin-
gle mothers move off welfare and into the workforce.54 Unfortu-
nately, the quality of the childcare these children receive is abys-
mal. 55 Many small children spend countless hours in front of the 
TV or wandering aimlessly with little adult contact or supervi-
sion. 56 Although these day care experiences may not differ much 
from life at home with mom-and thus may not exacerbate well-
documented deficits in schoo 1 readiness that plague this under-
privileged population-they certainly do little to improve the 
situation. Because, as noted, children can never be "undeserving," 
efforts to improve the care they might otherwise get as an adjunct 
to enabling parents to satisfy their debt to the collective need not 
fly in the face of fairness concerns or principles of equity. For this 
reason, a massive national commitment to better childcare for 
children of workers with modest earning power is not an illogical 
next step in the progress of welfare reform. 
To be sure, the issue of public help for poor children has never 
been free of complications. Because generosity to disadvantaged 
children inevitably benefits parents-including parents whose im-
prudent choices have contributed to the disadvantage-generous 
assistance for poor children will never square perfectly with hold-
ing parents to responsible standards of conduct. In addition, free 
54 See Tamar Lewin, Study Finds Welfare Changes Lead a Million Into Child Care, 
N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 2000, at Al7. 
55 See id. 
56 See id. 
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childcare for the poorest workers can be regarded as unfair to 
working parents who are not much better off. Unless a program is 
made universal up and down the income scale, "phase-outs" that 
create disincentives and unfairness as between persons very simi-
larly situated will never completely disappear. But providing bet-
ter childcare services in conjunction with enforcing work require-
ments under welfare reform at least softens the potential 
inequities. Everyone who receives assistance is, by definition, a 
wage earner who cannot otherwise make ends meet. And programs 
could gradually be expanded to assist as many wage earners as 
possible, regardless of welfare history. 
Any massive new public childcare effort must confront the 
many practical obstacles that stand in the way of delivering high 
quality childcare to poor children. The initiative would require 
states to enter a new and unfamiliar policy arena. Existing private 
and public services are inadequate, and governments in the United 
States have little experience with funding, supervising or running 
daycare programs on a widespread scale. State welfare bureaucra-
cies must effectively manage federal funds and Congress must 
continue to appropriate enough money to do the job. Officials 
must make hard tradeoffs between enforcing high standards and 
maintaining a diverse and broad supply of care. Some effort 
should probably be made to wean poor parents from their attach-
ment to "family" daycare-that is, childcare provided by untrained 
family or friends-which studies have shown to be inferior to care 
in well-run group centers.57 Alternatively, officials should explore 
ways to upgrade the most popular family care settings without 
being overly intrusive. Finally, the public must not expect too 
much. Rather, it must recognize that better non-parental care for 
young children is not a panacea and that even an expensive initia-
tive may not give poor children the start their middle and upper 
class counterparts receive. All of these are formidable challenges, 
but they can be met if there is a will. 
One common objection to a generous expansion of childcare 
programs for workers is that, by effectively subsidizing paid but 
not domestic unpaid employment, it encourages both parents in 
57 See Ann Crittenden, The Price of Motherhood: Why the Most Important Job in the 
World is Still the Least Valued 213-14 (2001) ; Lois W. Hoffman & Lise M. Young-
blade, Mothers at Work: Effects on Children's Well-Being 268-69 (1999). 
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two parent families to enter the workforce and favors working par-
ents over traditional breadwinner/homemaker families. Also, it 
may foster single-parenthood by pledging the government to make 
that model economically viable. The first objection suffers from 
the apparent tension between the background assumption that sin-
gle mothers will enter the workforce and the desire to encourage 
married mothers to stay home. But even if those stances are not as 
irreconcilable as they seem,58 this ground for objecting to generous 
daycare funding is disingenuous in light of the inadequacy of 
wages for many male workers without a college education. 59 Be-
cause it is almost impossible for families in this category to sup-
port themselves with one earner, family self-sufficiency and tradi-
tional family roles often cannot be reconciled in practice. To be 
sure, this assumes that the cost of providing child care subsidies to 
two-worker families will be less than the cost of supporting single-
breadwinner families, which may not always be the case where the 
wife's earning power is low. But it is reasonable to expect that 
overall costs to the government will be minimized by providing 
childcare assistance to working families, since most families with 
two or more workers will need less public support than those with 
only one earner even when the costs of childcare subsidies are 
taken into account. 
As to the charge of encouraging single-motherhood, it is im-
portant to recall that the commitment to support of single-parent 
families under the welfare reform model comes with significant 
strings attached in the form of a substantial paid work require-
ment.60 As any parent knows, that is a tough row to hoe, and one 
58 It might make sense to favor single mothers working full time and married mothers 
working only part-time or staying home on the theory that the latter will ordinarily have 
husbands who can supply income which, even if not completely adequate, will signifi-
cantly mitigate the family' s dependence on the government. Single mothers will have no 
other source of income. On this view, parental time with children, although highly desi r-
able, is not the first priority: economic self-sufficiency for the family unit is. Once that 
goal is satisfied, then the argument is that families should treat personal care for children 
as more desirable than the pursuit of additional income. 
59 See, e.g., Jason DeParle, Big Increase in Workers Living Below Poverty Line, 
Houston Chron. , Mar. 31 , 1994, at A 16 (noting that a disproportionate number of young 
workers and those lacking college degrees received wages placing them below the pov-
erty level). 
60 See Dan Bloom, After AFDC: Welfare-to-Work Choices and Challenges for States 
29 (1997) (noting that single parents with children under the age of six must currently 
engage in work activities for at least twenty hours per week). 
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that is significantly less attractive than the option many pre-reform 
recipient s expected, which was to function as a full-time mother at 
public expense. The notion that a government firmly committed to 
a reciprocal welfare system is making things "easy" for single 
mothers is strained at bes t, since those mothers must now confront 
the formidable logistics of holding down a job while arranging for 
childcare and transportation and enduring the anxiety of separation 
from their children for many hours each day. The challenges sin-
gle mothers face in discharging their obligations place a built-in 
limit on the moral hazard traditionally associated with govern-
mental support for single parents under the now defunct AFDC 
program. These requirements cannot be said to offer much encou r-
agement to would-be single parents, although future demographic 
trends in out-of-wedlock childbearing must be the ultimate test of 
this proposition. 
Other programs that fit in with a reciprocal paradigm for wel-
fare policy include work-related income supports and tax breaks . 
Edmund Phelps, for example, has recently put forward a proposal 
for subsidizing wages of full-time workers whose incomes fall 
below a generous subsistence minimum. 61 He proposes this pro-
gram as an alternative to the minimum wage, which he believes 
harms the least skilled workers by pricing them out of the labor 
market. 62 Phelps thinks the government should commit itself to 
making up the difference between the market wage unskilled 
workers can command and some reasonable "living wage," with a 
sliding scale of supplements to minimize the perverse effect on 
wage levels that such a subsidy would be expected to create.63 
Although wage subsidy programs like these are cumbersome to 
administer and are plagued with formidable practical difficulties,64 
they might nonetheless have some positive effect of signaling a 
willingness to make good on the promise that lies at the heart of a 
commitment to reciprocity in social welfare: that of guaranteeing a 
reasonable share of resources in exchange for a substantial work 
6 l Edmund S. Phelps, Rewarding Work: How to Restore Participation and Self-
Support to Free Enterprise 105-06 (1997). 
62 Id. at 146. 
63 See id at I 12- 13. 
64 See generally Anne L. Alstott, Work vs. Freedom: A Liberal Challenge to Em-
ployment Subsidies, 108 Yale L.J. 967 (1999) (arguing that employment subsidies are 
plagued with problems which make them less desirable than an unconditional cash grant 
program). 
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effort. 65 
Likewise, the recent expansion of the Earned Income Tax 
Credit ("EITC") is also in keeping with this commitment. The 
EITC program provides graduated refundable tax credits to work-
ers. Benefits increase as earnings climb up to a level of income 
that is roughly $ 11 ,000 yearly, depending on family composition, 
and then gradually phase out.66 Although the EITC program is not 
without problems- the phase-out discourages work and the mar-
riage penalty is severe-the offer of refundable tax credits (which 
effectively operate as an income supplement for many familie s) 
only to those who participate in the paid workforce once again 
represents a practical commitment to ensuring a minimally decent 
standard of living for those making a positive effort towards se lf-
sufficiency. 
Finally, welfare reform has made possible the creation of a 
number of "work-enabling" programs that are designed to aid 
former welfare recipients in their efforts to find and hold jobs.67 
For example, under the t1exible block grant structure of the Per-
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, some states have 
used federal funds for short-term emergency loans and for assis-
tance in purchasing and maintaining commuter automobiles.6S Be-
cause many jobs are not located close to poor neighborhoods and 
public transportation is often sporadic and unreliable , a private car 
can make the difference between success and failure in the job 
65 Phelps proposes ex tending the supplement only to full-time workers, mainly to 
minimize the expected income effect of the supplement, which may cause some persons 
to work fewer hours. Phelps, supra note 60, at I 08. Arguably, however, this restiiction is 
hard on those who choose to or are only able to work part-time, especiall y single mothers 
and women who function as second-earners. But it might be possible to modify the pro-
posal to include more part-time workers under selected circumstances-for exampl e, 
where there is only one adult in the family, or where one adult is already working full-
time. 
66 See Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-
Based Welfare Reform, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 533, 541 (1995). 
67 See Bloom, supra note 59, at 40-50 (discussing programs aimed at helping welfare 
recipients secure employment and/or develop educational or occupational skills neces-
sary to garner higher-wage jobs) . 
68 See, e.g., Alice Reid, On the Road From Welfare to Work; Pairi ng Clients and Cars, 
Fairfax Puts Jobs Within Reach, Wash. Post, Feb. 2, 1999, at AI (describing local pro-
grams designed to allow low-income workers to seek jobs in areas not se rved by rel iable 
public transportation by providing these indi viduals with cars at low or no cost). 
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market.69 For those who have demonstrated willingness to help 
themselves by seeking and performing work, providing money to 
purchase transportation fits well with reciprocal ideals. 
Although a full discussion cannot be undertaken here, other 
approaches that would square with an emphasis on reciprocal ob-
ligations might include: (1) giving low income workers priority in 
qualifying for public housing aid, daycare slots, and enrichment 
programs for children; (2) increasing the size of dependent or 
child-care credits for working families ; (3) creating public "last-
resort" jobs for those who repeatedly fail to obtain or hold onto 
jobs available in the private market; (4) providing subsidies for job 
training; and (5) continuing to provide public support to those pur-
suing education beyond high school. Some of these programs are 
controversial, are difficult to implement fairly and effectively, 70 or 
have been de-emphasized under the current federal scheme. 71 But 
the broad-based political support that reciprocally responsible 
69 See id. 
70 On public works programs and "workfare" type jobs, see, e .g., Matthew Diller, 
Working Without a Job: The Social Messages of the New Workfa re: Work Programs 
Are Deliberately Structured So That They Are Virtually Never Comparable to Holding 
an Actual Job, 9 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 19, 25-32 (1998) (arguing that workfare is not 
equivalent to a job, given that workfare participants receive fewer social benefits and 
legal protections than non-welfare employees) ; Mickey Kau s, The End of Equality 132-
35 ( 1992) (noting that, while it would be ineffici ent to place some welfare recipients on 
public works jobs, "at least the public would be getting something for its money."). 
71 Under welfare reform, states are not allowed to consider uni versity attendance as 
fulfilling work requirements, although they are not barred from assisting university stu-
dents with their own funds. See Bloom, supra note 59, at 115 . Permitting persons to re-
main on welfare while attending university may seem unfair to individuals who work to 
pay their own way through school. 
Although the justice of government provision of fundin g for training poorly skilled 
workers is often urged, see Dworkin, supra note 41, at 320-5 1, previous effort s to pro-
vide training have not borne much fruit. For a critique of the effectiveness of govern-
ment-sponsored training programs, see James J. Heckman, Is Job Training Oversold?, 
Pub. Int. , Spring 1994, at 111-14 (suggesting that it would be either impossible or pro-
hibitively expensive for the government to provide sufficient training to pull most people 
out of poverty). See also Michael Grunwald, Welfare-to-Work Isn't Cheap: How She 
Got a Job, Am. Prospect, July-Aug. 1997, at 26 (noting that in the face of the limited 
success of job training programs, "[t]he prevailing attitude of. . . mos t state-level welfare 
reforms . .. is 'work first. "'); Kay SHymowitz, At Last, a Job Program That Works, City 
J ., Winter 1997, at 32 (noting that the "giant carcasses of failed federal programs like 
CETA, the Manpower Development and Training Act, the Job Corps, and . . .JOBS, lit-
ter the landscape.") ; Lawrence M. Mead, Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obligations of 
Citizenship 148-56 (1986) (noting that the primary problem with the Work Incentive 
program was that the program's offices failed to make clear their expectation that its cl i-
ents actuall y work). 
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structures often generate may provide the momentum for adding 
some of these programs in future rounds of welfare reform. 
Moreover, the devolved structure of welfare reform offers the pos-
sibility of experimenting with new and creative approaches on a 
limited scale at the local level. Localism and devolution fit well 
with the understanding of social welfare as a reciprocal project 
that joins government and the disadvantaged in a productive part-
nership, since that project may best be realized through a flexible 
patchwork of programs that respond to varying individual circum-
stances. The period leading up to welfare reform has helped both 
recipients and governments understand that a rigid, one-size-fits-
all approach to poor relief may not work as well as one that can 
take into account market vicissitudes and individual needs. Those 
insights should continue to be extended by ongoing experimenta-
tion under the flexible mandate that welfare reform makes possi-
ble. 
Finally, it is important to step back from specific proposals to 
consider some broader questions that naturally arise from an em-
phasis on reciprocity as a principle that should guide redistribu-
tion. Should not the design of all redistributive programs, and not 
just those targeted to the poor, be scrutinized in light of this idea? 
Specifically, the logic of reciprocal obligation may force a re-
thinking of how our society responds to the problem of disability 
and how our approach to disability might be made more consistent 
with our treatment of the non-disabled poor. 
VI. THE MEDICALLY DISABLED VS. THE "LOW-ABILITY" 
POOR 
As already noted, central to the concept of reciprocation is the 
idea that society should commit to bringing all individuals up to a 
baseline level of well- being, provided they work reasonably hard. 
But in light of differences in skills and circumstances and the 
variation in ability to meet labor market demand, the degree of 
help needed to achieve minimum well-being will vary from person 
to person. Once again, the population will not neatly divide into 
those who should get global support and those who should not. 
Rather, we would expect to see a sliding scale of assistance, tai-
lored to each person's capacity to generate resources through rea-
sonable exertions. 
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But on this view, there appears to be no reason to adopt radi-
cally different policies towards those who meet the conventional 
medical criteria of "disability" and those who do poorly in the la-
bor market for other reasons. What both groups have in common is 
so me degree of deficit in the sk ills or abilities that employers 
value and the market rewards. More specifically, there is no prin-
cipled basis for distinguishing sharply between medical disabilities 
on the one hand, and inability or low ability on the other, as the 
source of the failure of a person 's reasonable effort s to yield 
enough to attain economic self-sufficiency. To be sure, the com-
mon sense intuition is that conventional disabilities result princi-
pally from bad luck. In most cases (although not all), affliction 
with a disabling condition is not something a person has brought 
upon himself. Moreover, to the extent that medical disability is 
generally considered to be outside a person 's control, the moral 
hazard that attends disability is assumed to be less than that for the 
kind of "inability" or "low ability" that makes it hard to find and 
hold jobs. Most people will not inflict an unpleasant physical or 
mental limitation on themselves as the price for public support. 
Poor skills, on the other hand, seem more amenable to correction 
through self-development. This applies not just to the skills that 
depend most directly on intellectual firepower, (the "hard skills" 
of technical expertise and job-related know-how) but even more so 
to the "soft skills" that seem to matter most to employers (such as 
punctuality, reliability, appearance, good manners and a positive 
attitude).72 
Yet leaving aside past failures of self-development, the fact 
remains that some workers find themselves unable to meet em-
ployers' expectations for available jobs despite a strong desire to 
work and what appear to be good faith efforts to secure and retain 
employment. And many of the jobs that the least skilled workers 
can hold down do not pay enough to maintain self-sufficiency or 
72 See Philip Moss & Chris Tilly, Stories Employers Tell : Race, Skill , and Hiring in 
America 44, 58-68 (2001). 
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support a family. 73 Although persons who work at such jobs are in 
some sense employable and emplo yed, they are not economically 
independent. They need public help to keep body and soul to-
gether. Given the background economic conditions that all work-
ers face , it is not inaccurate to say that these workers, although 
seemingly "able-bodied," are the victims of an involuntary or un-
lucky inability or lack of ability to perform well enough to obviate 
the need for public assistance. 
But this analysis begs the ques tion of how this group is differ-
ent from the category of persons classified as "medically dis-
abled"- a category that is excused from working altogetherJ4 
The technical definition of an excusable disability in federal law 
today requires that a person be afflicted with a medical condition 
that prevents him from performing any job that exists in the econ-
omy. 75 But in practice disability programs so metimes award bene-
fits to persons who could hold down some kind of job.76 Moreo-
ver, our system a voids administrative complexity by failing to 
recognize the category of partial disability, which leads to some 
over-inclusiveness. But perhaps the important point about policies 
towards the disabled is that disability benefits programs as cur-
rently structured are oblivious to the possibilities suggested by a 
different federal enactment that deals with disabled workers: the 
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")J7 That statute requires 
employers to refrain from discriminating against disabled persons 
by offering them reasonable accommodations on the job-which 
means accommodations that do not place an undue financial bur-
den on employers. 78 But that requirement contemplates that many 
disabled persons can work productively. Although they cannot 
73 See Kathryn Edin & Laura Lein, Making Ends Meet: How Single Mothers Survive 
Welfare and Low-Wage Work, 228-29 (1 997); Christopher Jencks, Rethinking Social 
Policy: Race, Poverty, and the Underclass, 205-07 (1 992) (noting that a study of the Illi-
nois welfare system found that, unless most welfare mothers lived in subsidi zed housing, 
their income earned from employment barely paid rent and utility bills) . 
74 See Supplemental Security Income (SSI) , 42 USCS § 1381 (2000); Federal Old-
Afe, Survivors, & Disability Insurance Benefits (OASDI), 42 USDS § 402 (2000). 
7 See supra note 73. 
76 For example, the regul ations under the OADSI and S~I programs contain li stings of 
conditions for which persons are considered disabled per se. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1525(a), 
416.9 ll(a)(l) (2001). 
77 42 u.s.c. § 12101-12213 (2000). 
78 See Michael Faillace, Disability Law Deskbook: The Americans with Di sabiliti es 
Act in the Workplace 4-4 (2000). 
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perform the precise jobs offered in the labor market without so me 
modification or restructuring, they can produce net economic 
value if employers make changes to meet their special needs. But 
that insight just raises the issue of why many of the disabled 
should not just be entitled to, but also should be expected to, work 
under those conditions. Which in turn gives rise to the question of 
which alternative comports best with reciprocity principles: ex-
cusing persons with physical impairments from working altogether 
because they cannot perform existing jobs as well as other people 
or striving to engage as many people as reasonably possible in 
productive activities regardless of degree of ability or disability by 
making some changes to the work that they do. The latter would 
appear to comport better with the baseline expectation that every-
one exert reasonable efforts towards self-sufficiency by striving to 
contribute something to his own support. The ADA seems to em-
body the assumption that under the right circumstances many per-
sons who are not fully "able-bodied"-all except the most se-
verely afflicted-can exert such an effort to good effect. 
The centrality of reciprocity suggests the following principle: 
that society ought to expect virtually every mature adult, regard-
less of ability, to contribute productively to his own upkeep and to 
the social product, but that this obligation carries the correspond-
ing duty on the part of society both to secure the opportunity to 
make that contribution and to make up for any shortfall in self-
sufficiency. The baseline assumption on which this principle oper-
ates is that many individuals with "disabilities" and low ability can 
contribute something positive, however modest. We ought to ex-
pect and facilitate those efforts. Perhaps we should move towards 
a scheme in which "supported work" is the rule rather than the ex-
ception for all persons who, despite reasonable efforts, are unable 
to support themselves regardless of the reason for that shortfall. In 
all cases, the need for assistance stems from essentially the same 
cause: a mismatch of the attributes of persons and the demands of 
the economy. Yet such a mismatch does not relieve the able-
bodied poor of the obligation to make reasonable efforts. Why 
should it relieve the conventionally disabled? As the political sci-
entist Stuart White has suggested, the reciprocity norm would ap-
pear to dictate "[u]niversal enforcement of the minimum standard 
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of productive participation."79 According to White, this means 
that: 
If we are going to insist that any one citizen satis-
fies reciprocity-based obligations in return for assur-
ance of a minimum standard of living, than fairness 
requires that we apply the same logic to all citizens (or 
all productively capable citizens). It is patently unfair 
if I have to contribute for my living while you, no less 
productively capable than I, do not. SO 
A reciprocal social welfare policy would thus seem to dictate 
not only that all persons regardless of productive capacity exert 
some effort towards their own support, but also that all failures to 
achieve self-sufficiency despite reasonable good faith efforts 
should be treated alike. A unified approach provides no obvious 
basis for distinguishing between those with medically recognized 
physical and mental impairments and those who, through lack of 
intelligence or other personal attributes, are unable to obtain or 
perform jobs that provide economic independence. On this view, a 
wide range of disabilities and inabilities would trigger supple-
mentation of some kind, provided that the beneficiary "does his 
part" as best he can. Once again, this approach is most consistent 
with the recognition that the population does not divide neatly into 
those who need no assistance (because they are "able-bodied" 
enough to earn their own way) and those who need comprehensive 
support (because they are "disabled" and thus wholly relieved of 
any obligation.) Rather, the population exemplifies a continuum of 
greater or lesser abilities, inabilities, and disabilities. Although 
those deficits may prevent some from performing or competing for 
jobs that are actually offered and others from earning enough to 
support themselves and their dependents, they will rarely foreclose 
constructive or productive activity of some kind. Reciprocity 
norms may well entail some obligation on society's part to meet 
these individuals halfway by ensuring that they are offered a rea-
sonable chance to contribute-a chance that the unregulated labor 
market may not always provide. The ADA can be viewed as em-
bodying some acknowledgment of a public obligation to give dis-
abled persons the opportunity to work, with the caveat of not 
79 White, supra note 3, at 516. 
80 I d. 
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placing too great a burden on employers who bear the brunt of the 
costs of accommodation. The suggestion here, however, is that we 
ought to go beyond this to acknowledge additional obligations on 
both sides. This would entail recognizing that the quid pro quo for 
reasonable accommodation is not just the right to work if one 
wants to, but also a responsibility to work if one can do so pro-
ductively. This would extend reciprocal obligations not just to the 
"able-bodied" poor but also to many who have conventionally 
been regarded as less than able-bodied. 
This plea for a unified approach to different sources of disad-
vantage in competitive labor markets also gives rise to the ques-
tion of why the duty of "reasonable accommodation" should ex-
tend only to the medically disabled. Does society have an 
obligation to provide extra work opportunities to those who do 
poorly in labor markets for other reasons? Because the work re-
quirements in the Welfare Reform Act are still phasing in, the wel-
fare system does cmTently continue to assist many of the least 
skilled who manage to obtain only intermittent employment-a 
feature that can perhaps be viewed as one form of "reasonable ac-
commodation." But a more direct accommodation to those who 
fail to fit into the paid labor market is the provision in some states 
of workfare jobs and government "last resort" employment pro-
grams .8 1 Like the ADA's requirement that employers offer a rea-
sonable accommodation to disabled persons who are able to per-
form most essentials of a job, 82 these workfare programs are based 
on the tacit understanding that the economy may not offer every-
one an adequate opportunity to discharge a reciprocal obligation to 
contribute something to the social product without some special 
measures designed to keep them productively at work.83 In the 
case of workfare, the "special measures" are the actual creation of 
positions that are tailored to the lesser capacities of those who re-
peatedly fail on the private job market. 
81 Rachel L. Swarns, Ideas and Trends; A Wakeup Call for Workfare' s Advocates, 
N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1998, §4, at 5 (noting that most welfare program officials view 
workfare as a "last resort" because it is costly and often does not lead participants to 
placement in real jobs). 
82 See Fai !lace, supra note 77. 
83 See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Life' s Work, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1881 , 1933-35 (2000) 
(discussing the conceptual connection between supports for welfare Ieavers and provid-
ing work opportunities for the di sabled). 
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The discussion also begs the question of how society should 
deal with persons at the very bottom of the ladder -persons for 
whom the social costs of providing a chance to engage in effortful 
activity threatens to exceed any net benefit. There may well be 
people who are more expensive to keep at work than to maintain 
in idleness. 84 It is one thing for the group to supplement the earn-
ings of a worker who, although not productive enough to support 
himself, is able to help defray the costs of his own survival. It is 
quite another for society to expend extra resources so that a 
worker can be seen to "contribute" to his own support by per-
forming some job, even if making that job available to him results 
in a net loss overall. How does the duty of reciprocity play out in 
that situation? Certainly the ADA seems to have resolved that 
question in favor of idleness for the disabled with room to spare: 
employers are not required to spend so much to employ a disabled 
person that their business suffers a net loss, even if the job might 
generate savings for the taxpaying public (and thus net savings 
overall). 85 As a general matter, however, there is no definitive an-
swer to this question for the general run of cases. Rather, the an-
swer is: "It depends." On the one hand, the intuitions behind reci-
procity would point to the arbitrariness of relieving persons of any 
responsibility to expend "reasonable efforts" based simply on the 
bad-or good-fortune of being profoundly unproductive. On the 
other hand, our decisions may in part depend on why someone's 
efforts yield so little. Pity or sympathy may impel us to excuse 
those with severe physical or mental deficiencies on the theory 
that they have already "suffered enough." But those whose prob-
lems are general incompetence or intransigent bad habits may ex-
cite less sympathy-perhaps because they incite the residual sus-
picion that they are not entirely "blameless" for their own plight or 
because they lack the obvious deformities that elicit sympathetic 
84 See, e.g., Phelps, supra note 60, at 157 (discussing the possibility that some workers 
of limited talent or disadvantaged background may be either impossible to train or so 
expensive to train that net productivity is zero or negative). 
85 Cf. 29 U.S.C. §§ 12111(10), 12112(5)(a) (2001) (defining "discriminate" as "not 
making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an 
otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless 
such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue 
hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity," and also defining "un-
due hardship" as an "action requiring significant difficulty or expense" in light of certain 
enumerated factors, including the cost of such an action and the financial resources of 
the employer). 
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emotions. In any case, soCietles must make some decision about 
how to deal with this category of persons by determining whether 
considerations of cost and efficiency outweigh the values of con-
sistency and equity or vice versa. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This essay has attempted to show that a welfare system moti-
vated by overarching principles of social reciprocity would share 
some of the features that have already been incorporated into our 
system through recent reform and through longstanding practice, 
and would also add or expand some programs and introduce addi-
tional elements into the scheme. A system that assists and gives 
special privileges to workers but takes steps to ensure that the 
maximum number of willing persons can claim a place among the 
ranks of workers, best accords with that reciprocal ideal. There is 
no one set of measures that perfectly realizes this concept; many 
options are available and some may work better than others de-
pending on the circumstances. Ultimately, experience must be the 
guide to the most effective implementation of reciprocal ideals. 
